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Abstract: 
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial 
sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, 
expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard 
ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by 
comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. 
The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well 
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errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit 
quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. 
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The global ﬁnancial crisis can be considered the most severe economic crisis since the
great depression of the 1930s. While its starting point in 2007 caught many by surprise
it is still unclear whether it is overcome or still virulent. Explanations for the outbreak of
the crisis are manifold: Causational relationships on the micro and macroeconomic level
have been addressed e.g. by Issing (2009). The microeconomic explanation is the persis-
tent exploitation of information asymmetries in structured ﬁnance products. Misaligned
incentives were induced by weak regulation, questionable ratings and a short-term fo-
cus of managerial compensation schemes. The macroeconomic story on the other hand is
about global imbalances in consumption and production, combined with long lasting low
interest rates in the U.S. Over the last decade the leading global exporting countries, such
as China and Germany, acquired large funds and reinvested them in the well developed
ﬁnancial markets of the U.S. where, in turn, the funding resulted in overinvestment in
the real estate markets. Although these explanations are convincing, we believe another
factor has to be taken into account: A high degree of uncertainty about the current and
future situation of the banking system and its inherent systemic risk. Financial trans-
actions generally depend on trust in the business relationship and the overall ﬁnancial
system and high uncertainty ampliﬁes the likelihood of runs on ﬁnancial institutions. We
believe it is this erosion of trust which ampliﬁed the crisis. Following Knight (1921) un-
certainty of future events can be described as a state in which the underlying distribution
is unknown. This resembles a distinct diﬀerence to the standard deﬁnition of risk, where
an increase translates into an increase in volatility of future outcomes. Bloom (2009),
following this tradition, argues that ﬁrms postpone hiring and investment decisions when
the future is highly uncertain, because adjustment to optimal capital and labor inputs is
costly and would need to be revised when future demand would not meet future capaci-
ties. Thus, recessions might arise in response to uncertainty, because cost-minimizing and
risk-averse behavior cause rational inactivity until more certain expectations about the
future economy will arrive.
Bloom (2009) measured uncertainty by making use of a stock market volatility index. We
are fortunate to use German survey data from the Center for Financial Studies (CFS,
1Frankfurt) to measure conﬁdence and uncertainty, as their data encloses the same time
frame as the ﬁnancial crisis. Germany is appealing to our research setting as it is the
strongest European economy and it has been severely aﬀected by the ﬁnancial turmoil.
Many banks in Germany, especially in the public sector, bore great risks in their credit
portfolio. A large fraction of these banks were highly leveraged and had strongly in-
vested in sub-prime markets using structured products. In addition short-term ﬁnancing
increased the dependency on a well-functioning interbank market. As we know now, for
many ﬁnancial institutions, such a proﬁle denoted a formula for failure.
The innovative feature of the CFS survey compared to well-established ifo (Munich) and
ZEW (Mannheim) surveys of Germany’s economic prospects is twofold. First, the focus
is on the ﬁnancial sector, i.e. respondents of the ﬁnancial sector report on their individ-
ual situation within the ﬁnancial sector (which diﬀers from the ZEW ﬁnancial experts’
panel and from ifo, where respondents are interviewed regarding the economy as a whole,
or about individual situations within manufacturing or service companies, respectively).
Thus, typical questions regarding ﬁnancial institutions as, for instance, transaction volume
will be covered in the CFS survey (and are not reported elsewhere). A second, perhaps
minor but still interesting and innovative point is the presence of a ‘no response’ category
in the CFS questionnaire. This feature might help to avoid reporting biases from forced
responses. In this paper, we also interpret variations in the ‘no response’ replies as an
indicator of uncertainty.
The availability of survey data covering individual situations of banks and other companies
of the ﬁnancial sector during the ﬁnancial crisis provides a unique source allowing us to
analyze the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating
individual survey data, we ﬁrst present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing
CFS indicators of conﬁdence and predicted conﬁdence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The
major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty which are based
on both standard deviation and skewness of individual appraisals of current situations,
expectations and forecast surprises (forecast errors), as well as on ‘no response’ replies.
Comparisons with real (GDP, investment) and ﬁnancial data (total assets, VDAX) reveal
that the CFS survey provides a value added to already existent surveys on Germany’s
current and future economic and ﬁnancial situation.
2The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a description of CFS data and provides
comparisons with well-known reference time series. Section 3 presents well established
and new measures of uncertainty and compares them to real and ﬁnancial data. Section
4 concludes.
2 CFS survey-based indicators:
Construction and presentation
The ifo Business Climate Index and the ZEW indicator of Economic Sentiment are the
two most popular German sentiment indices. Both possess a long tradition and can claim
to have an impact on markets as changes in the indices regularly transform into subse-
quent security price changes (see Entorf, Gross, Steiner, 2009). We compare the concepts
of the CFS Financial Center Index with the ifo and ZEW indicators and ﬁnd that it fea-
tures a distinct design which uniquely covers an existing research gap: The CFS surveys
the ﬁnancial sector in Germany, while the ifo Business Climate Index addresses ﬁrms in
manufacturing, construction, wholesaling and retailing. The ZEW indicator of Economic
Sentiment asks ﬁnancial experts, but although the group of participants could partially
intercept, the aim of the ZEW index does not, because the ZEW respondents do not
report on their own business, but on the perspective of macroeconomic ﬁgures in global
markets (e.g. inﬂation, interest and exchange rates, commodities price and equity mar-
kets). We believe the major contribution of the CFS index is to explicitly measure the
business sentiment of the ﬁnancial sector in Germany on ﬁrm level, as this allows us to
exploit heterogeneity in responses controlling for ﬁrm characteristics. The CFS index is
clearly a newcomer in the ﬁeld of survey-based indicators and our paper is the ﬁrst to
analyze this ﬁnancial sector data.
The ambition of the CFS Financial Center Index is to measure the business sentiment of
the German ﬁnancial system following a value added concept, which is incorporated by
the type of questions asked and the composition of the panel. Concerning the latter, CFS
deﬁnes the ﬁnancial center using four groups: At the core of a ﬁnancial center are the
ﬁnancial intermediaries, including banks, asset managers, insurances, security exchanges,
3brokers, venture capital and private equity enterprises (see Table A1 of the Appendix
for a complete list). The intermediaries provide the market to channel funds between
lenders and borrowers whilst generating added value by term transformation, convenience
denomination and risk allocation. Around the core many service providers cluster. They
are specialized in various ways on serving the needs of the intermediaries as advisors,
accountants, lawyers, rating agencies, IT-service providers and media ﬁrms. The third
group consists of supervisory and academic institutions. The institutions are not private
companies and directly engaged in ﬁnancial transactions or services, but they either shape
and monitor the legal framework of the ﬁnancial center or accumulate ﬁnance-speciﬁc
human capital as a resource for the ﬁrst two groups and improve knowledge of ﬁnance.
Finally in the fourth cluster connected enterprises beneﬁt from the ﬁnancial center without
directly being involved in ﬁnance related activities. Airliners, hotels businesses, high end
car dealers, fair organizers and real estate ﬁrms, belong to this group. After ﬁrm entities
are categorized in one of the four diﬀerent groups, CFS requires each entity’s respondent
to be in a leading executive position. This top-level approach is to ensure the participant’s
overview suﬃces to assess her current business situation as well as to make meaningful
forecasts.
The survey form contains questions about the participant’s view on four diﬀerent busi-
ness parameters: transaction volume, proﬁts, employment and investment in product- and
process innovations1. The answers to the questions may be given qualitatively as “pos-
itive”, “neutral”, “negative” or “no reply” and a response is requested for the elapsed
and the forthcoming quarter. The CFS index explicitly allows the “no reply” option in
order to circumvent a response bias. This is in contrast to the ifo index, where this is not
incorporated. Furthermore we exploit the “no reply” option in order to generate a new
uncertainty measure (see Section 3.2 of this paper). The survey is carried out quarterly,
in four waves per year, at the beginning of each January, April, July and October. Hence,
the timing is always at the junction of two quarters and yields a response for the elapsed
quarter, which CFS labels “Performance”, as well as a forecast for the forthcoming quar-
ter, the “Prediction”. The wave period is seven workdays and results of the surveys are
published within a ten workday time frame after the end of the survey. CFS provides a
1The original wording used in the questionnaire (in German language) refers to “Gesch¨ aftsvolumen”,
“Ertragssituation”, “Mitarbeiterzahl” and “Investititionssumme in Produkt- oder Prozessinnovationen”.
4press report of the current index value with an interpretation of the aggregated results
and the most dominant movements in sub indices. Additionally a press conference is held
twice a year, where a more detailed description is oﬀered. Branch speciﬁc information is
exclusively distributed to respondents in order to induce them to participate by beneﬁting
from a peer group comparison. The survey was repeated in 14 waves and the time range
of the quarterly data is from January 2007 until April 2010 yielding 2922 answers of an
average of 442.
Levine (1997) provides a summary review on how economists link the real economy with
the ﬁnancial sector. This bond is well-established in the literature and dates back to
Schumpeter (1911) who described a positive association between the per capita growth
rate and the development of the ﬁnancial sector. The research focus has advanced to which
channels drive the dependency and how the causal direction between the two sectors can be
identiﬁed. Rajan and Zingales (1998) promote an active role of the ﬁnancials, by presenting
evidence of the impact of the ﬁnancial sector on the real economy. A major argument is
that the better the ﬁnancial sector is developed, the less costly external ﬁnancing for ﬁrms
becomes which in turn reduces costs of capital and promotes innovation and economic
growth. But even if ﬁnancial development should be nothing more but an indicator for
economic growth, a reasonable prior in assessing the CFS data is that the ﬁnancial sector
and the real economy sector should be positively correlated. CFS provided us with the
raw dataset of the survey responses in an anonymous form and throughout the paper we
use this data to create several measures and relate them to the ﬁnancial crisis. We ﬁrst
compute indicators of conﬁdence as a time series of balances of equally weighted positive
and negative answers. More formally, these indicators are based on individual qualitative
responses of survey participants which are coded as
Ci =

      
      
1 if respondent is positive (about current/future situation)
0 if respondent is neutral (about current/future situation)
−1 if respondent is negative (about current/future situation)
na if no certain answer (i.e. ‘+’, ‘=’ or ‘-’) given
(2.1)
At the aggregate level, like many CIRET survey institutes such as ifo (Munich) and ZEW
5(Mannheim) in Germany, so-called balances are calculated as the diﬀerence between the
shares of positive and negative answers in the sample (i.e. by ignoring respondents who
are uncertain about their answers):
C =
1
N
N  
i=1
Ci = P
+ − P
− (2.2)
where P + = C+
N share of positive answers in the sample (with N being the number
of valid +,= and - responses; P − is deﬁned analogously). ifo uses the same concept
for surveying the current (“Gesch¨ aftslagebeurteilung”) and expected economic situation
(“Gesch¨ aftslage-erwartung”), also ZEW economic forecasts (“ZEW-Konjunkturerwartungen”)
are based on the balance of positive and negative replies. Using the notion of “conﬁ-
dence” (following Bachmann et al. 2010) we believe that changing levels of C represent
varying conﬁdence levels of transaction volume, proﬁts, employment and investment in
product- and process innovations. We distinguish between the appraisal of the current
(performance) conﬁdence and the (expected) predicted performance during the forthcom-
ing quarter. We ﬁnd that conﬁdence is U-shaped over the sample period for all of the four
categories (Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1). At the beginning of the survey in January 2007 the
time series show the highest values followed by an erosion of conﬁdence for several waves.
We locate the minima of conﬁdence levels between October 2008 and April 2009, a time
period which many consider the climax of the ﬁnancial crisis, while from the second half
of 2009 conﬁdence ﬁgures increase again (see Figure 2.1).
The climax of the ﬁnancial crisis coincides with several prominent rescue events and
subsequent restructuring in the German banking sector. The prelude of the ﬁnancial
crisis was the sub-prime crisis, triggered by the decline of the housing market in the U.S
at the beginning of 2007. The bust of the asset bubble reached Germany in February
as West-LB was rescued with federal state aid. In August 2007 the Sachsen Landesbank
collapsed due to their sub-prime investments and was taken over by Baden-Wuerttemberg
Landesbank. In July 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG announced a large loss in
the sub-prime market as well and was rescued by KfW Bankengruppe. An escalation
of the crisis coincided with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, because
the interconnectedness of the banking sector spread the fear of contagion eﬀects. The
6Table 2.1: Conﬁdence and predicted Conﬁdence Descriptive Statistics
a) Conﬁdence (Performance) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max t(Min) t(Max)
transaction volume 0.300 0.300 -0.128 0.800 1-Apr-09 1-Jan-07
proﬁts 0.234 0.311 -0.157 0.795 1-Oct-08 1-Jan-07
employment 0.117 0.195 -0.162 0.376 1-Jul-09 1-Apr-07
investment in 0.146 0.151 -0.089 0.369 1-Apr-09 1-Jan-07
product- and process innovations
b) Predicted Conﬁdence Mean Std. Dev. Min Max t(Min) t(Max)
transaction volume 0.340 0.292 -0.098 0.773 1-Oct-08 1-Jan-07
proﬁts 0.271 0.274 -0.139 0.655 1-Oct-08 1-Jan-07
employment 0.145 0.200 -0.156 0.418 1-Apr-09 1-Jan-07
investment in 0.190 0.163 -0.074 0.452 1-Apr-09 1-Jan-07
product- and process innovations
i. The table summarizes conﬁdence and predicted conﬁdence measures from the CFS Financial
Center Index. Conﬁdence is the balance of positive and negative shares of replies about the four
business categories of the CFS survey for a) the past and b) the forthcoming quarter ii. In the second
column means over the sample period from 2007.I to 2010.II and in the third column standard
deviations followed by minima and maxima are shown. iii. In the last two columns t(Min) and
t(Max) are the survey dates o the highest and lowest value of the conﬁdence measures.
vulnerability of the ﬁnancial intermediaries to liquidity risk became evident since German
ﬁnancial institutions with a reliance on short-term reﬁnancing were under stress as lending
on the interbank market ceased. Banks hoarded liquidity, because the trust into their
counterparties had abruptly eroded and the ECB stepped in as a lender of last resort.
In October 2008 the severity of the crisis induced European leaders to create very large
national rescue plans to reestablish conﬁdence in the banking sector. The German rescue
package consisted of e80 bn. in funds and e400 bn. in state backed guarantees, and
although the package was not fully depleted, the German government was forced to use
it extensively to aid some of the largest German banks: In October 2008 Hypo Real
Estate and Bayern LB were rescued from failure, followed by Commerzbank in January
2009 which, as one of the largest German commercial banks, was partially nationalized.
In February 2009 HSH Nordbank received additional funds and federal state guarantees
by Schleswig-Holstein. Finally until March 2009 eighteen German banks had applied for
state help, the identity of many institutes was not revealed in order to preserve the bank’s
reputation and prevent panic-based runs.
7Figure 2.1: Presentation of aggregate conﬁdence and predicted conﬁdence indicators
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We start analyzing time series characteristics by comparing the behavior of CFS conﬁdence
relative to ZEW and ifo indices, as all three indices are based on balances of positive and
negative replies, and all sources report aggregate survey information on current and future
economic situations. Table 2.2 gives a ﬁrst impression of the strength of interrelationships
by looking at (contemporaneous) correlation coeﬃcients. CFS time series are positively
correlated with current-situation indicators of ifo and ZEW. The correlation is very strong
with an average of 0.85 and highly signiﬁcant at the one percent error level. Table 2.2
shows a positive correlation between most of the forecasts as well, with one exception:
The average correlation is still strong (0.65), but the ZEW forecast is not signiﬁcantly
correlated with the conﬁdence forecast and the ifo forecast. We thereby can unambiguously
relate our sample to the ifo index but not to the ZEW forecast. This result could be
due to the ZEW question design about forecasts for the whole economy, which seems to
conceptually diﬀer from the CFS and the ifo survey on ﬁrm level. Are there signiﬁcant
leads or lags within the system of CFS indicators or with respect to the well known ifo
climate index (based on the geometric mean of appraisals and expectations) or ZEW
indicators of current and expected economic situations? Table 2.3 reveals that for most
8indicators no lead or lag can be identiﬁed. The only signiﬁcant exception is the ZEW
economic forecast, i.e. the so called ZEW indicator of economic sentiment. Looking at the
evidence since 2007, the latter seems to have a lead of three quarters and even more over all
other indicators (at the cost of much lower correlation). However, it seems to be an outlier
when compared to the performance of other time series under comparison2. As regards
CFS data, only employment conﬁdence has a lag of one quarter behind other indicators
(except the ZEW forecasts outlier) conﬁrming the stylized fact that employment is usually
considered as a lagging business cycle indicator. ifo climate and conﬁdence indicators
related to transaction volume and proﬁts all have some coinciding business cycle pattern.
There seems to be no particular early-indicator information when predicted conﬁdence
indicators were used, as can be seen from the coinciding time series phases of predicted
and current conﬁdence in transaction volume (the same conclusion holds for all other
conﬁdence categories). Some indirect inference reveals that both proﬁts conﬁdences and
transaction-volume conﬁdence might even have a small lead over the ifo climate index:
Its cross-correlation function with ZEW economic situation has its maximum at lag = 0,
whereas both CFS indicators have a lead of one quarter over the ZEW indicator, which
is assessing the prevailing current economic situation. Simply counting the number of
one-quarter-leads suggests that conﬁdence in proﬁts (3 one-quarter-leads) is the most
promising CFS leading indicator.
2Table 2.3 only reports positive local maxima of the cross-correlation function because we are primarily
interested in pro-cyclical indicators. Analyzing (absolute) extreme values we ﬁnd that these turn out to
be minima which indicates some strong counter-cyclical behavior. This is not the case for other time
series listed in Table 2.3. For instance, inspecting leads and lags with respect to the ifo climate, we found
a (posititive) maximum correlation of 0.57 at a lag of 3 quarters (reported in Table 2.3) and a (negative)
minimum of -0.92 at a lead (of ifo climate) at 3. Of course, this would be no contradiction when the cycle
length would be 12 quarters, because for cycles of length c a lead of τ periods with positive maximum
cross correlation would be equivalent to a lag of ( c
2 − τ) with negative minimum cross correlation.
9Figure 2.2: Comparison of survey based indicators
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Figure 2.2 gives a visual impression of the time series behavior of the predicted CFS
conﬁdence indicator of transaction volume (balances) in comparison to the ifo climate
index and the ZEW economic situation indicator (balances). All of them have more or
less the same time series pattern, all indicating an excellent economic situation in 2007,
a lasting downswing starting in the ﬁrst half of the year 2008, and a recovery in 2009.
However, the exact timing of the turning point ranges between the fourth quarter of 2008
and the second quarter of 2009. The sequence of indicators does not come as a surprise:
in October 2008, the earliest indication of an upswing is observed for the CFS indicator
which is supposed to cover future transaction volumes in the ﬁnance sector; the next time
series showing an upturn is ifo climate (based on the geometric mean of appraisals and
expectations, i.e. something averaging early and coinciding indicators), ﬁnally followed by
the ZEW survey indicator representing the prevailing economic situation of considered
survey periods (ZEW economic situation).
In Figure 2.3, CFS indicators are compared to growth rates of German GDP. As expected
from previous cross-correlation analysis, predicted conﬁdence related to transaction vol-
ume and proﬁts conﬁdence are leading indicators of GDP, whereas employment conﬁdence
10Table 2.2: Contemporaneous Correlation Matrix of r(Xt,Yt)
Xt\Yt Conﬁdence Predicted Conﬁdence ZEW ifo
trans. vol. proﬁts employ. invest. trans. vol. proﬁt employ. invest. situation forecast situation
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
.
proﬁts 0.9777*
employment 0.8092* 0.7230*
investment 0.8955* 0.8249* 0.9543*
P
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
c
e
transaction volume 0.9562* 0.9502* 0.7433* 0.8357*
proﬁt 0.9558* 0.9668* 0.7144* 0.8100* 0.9889*
employment 0.9612* 0.8987* 0.9218* 0.9474* 0.8980* 0.8842*
investment 0.9508* 0.9168* 0.8767* 0.9340* 0.9144* 0.8991* 0.9671*
Z
E
W
situation 0.8766* 0.8013* 0.9782* 0.9566* 0.8266* 0.8010* 0.9667* 0.9320*
forecast 0.0665 0.1917 -0.4645 -0.2881 0.1896 0.2354 -0.1828 -0.1048 -0.2086*
i
f
o situation 0.7857* 0.7062* 0.9682* 0.9411* 0.7303* 0.6976* 0.9035* 0.8955* 0.9152* -0.3026*
forecast 0.8202* 0.8454* 0.5819 0.6845* 0.8786* 0.8918* 0.7611* 0.8192* 0.5354* 0.4772* 0.5381*
i. The table summarizes the contemporaneous correlation of conﬁdence measures from the CFS survey, the ifo economic situation and forcast as
well as the ZEW economic situation and forecast. ii. On the axis are four items, conﬁdence and predicted conﬁdence measures from the CFS survey
and the ifo and ZEW indicees. Conﬁdence relates to four business categories: transaction volume, proﬁts, employment and investment in product-
and process innovation iii. The ifo economic situation is the translation for the German “Gesch¨ aftsbeurteilung”, the ifo economic forecast is the
translation for “Gesch¨ aftserwartungen”. The ZEW economic situation is “Beurteilung der aktuellen Lage” and the ZEW economic forecast are the
“Konjunkturerwartungen” vi. The sample period is 2007.I to 2010.II. v. Quarterly data of ifo and ZEW are obtained by averaging original monthly
data vi. *) denotes signiﬁcant correlation at 1% level.
1
1Table 2.3: Maximal Cross Correlation of r(Xt,Yt−τ) and corresponding lag τ(of X behind Y )
Xt\Yt−τ Conﬁdence Pred. Conﬁd. ifo ZEW
trans. vol. proﬁts employ. invest. trans. vol. climate situation
C
o
n
ﬁ
d
e
n
c
e proﬁts 0.98
(0)
employ. 0.90 0.86
(+1) (+1)
investments 0.90 0.83 0.95
(0) (+1) (0)
P
r
e
d
.
C
o
n
f
.
trans. vol. 0.96 0.95 0.85 0.83
(0) (0) (-1) (0)
i
f
o climate 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.85 0.94
(0) (0) (-1) (-1) (0)
Z
E
W situation 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.91
(+1) (+1) (0) (0) (+1) (0)
forecast 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.57 0.48
(-3) (-3) (-5) (-5) (-3) (-3) (-4)
i. Maxima of cross-correlation functions and corresponding leads and lags of reported time series.
Read, for example: “ZEW economic situation has a lag of +1 behind ‘conﬁdence in proﬁts’; the
corresponding correlation coeﬃcient at lag +1 is 0.92”. ii. The sample period is 2007.I to 2010.II.
iii. Quarterly data of ifo and ZEW are obtained by averaging original monthly data
is lagging behind. As CFS data focus on ﬁnancial data, it is straightforward to compare
survey data to data of the ﬁnancial sector. We use total assets of all banks in Germany as
reference time series of the ‘real’ ﬁnancial sector which should be directly related to the
survey question on transaction volume. Figure 2.4 shows levels and growth rates of total
assets, together with the conﬁdence indicator of the transaction volume. The graph does
not reveal any evident relationship. However, using growth rates of total assets instead of
levels reveals that CFS conﬁdence data are helpful in predicting changes in total assets
(see Figure 2.5).
Table 2.4 summarizes cross-correlation ﬁndings based on growth rates of total assets. As
expected from Figure 2.5, CFS data show a lead of one quarter. The same holds for ifo
climate. Correlations are highest for predicted conﬁdence and ifo index.
Summing up, CFS indicators provide an interesting source of information concerning the
economic situation in general and the ﬁnancial sector in particular. Cross-correlations and
visual inspections show a strong correlation with well-established indicators such as the
ifo climate index or ZEW economic situation. Future experience with CFS is required in
12Figure 2.3: CFS conﬁdence indicators as leading and lagging indicators of German GDP
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Figure 2.4: Total assets and transaction-volume conﬁdence
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13Figure 2.5: Growth rates of total assets and transaction-volume conﬁdence
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Table 2.4: Maximal Cross Correlation of r(Xt,Yt−τ) and corresponding lag τ(of X behind Y ),
X = total assets
Xt\Yt−τ Conﬁdence Pred. Conﬁd. Conﬁdence ifo ZEW
trans. vol. trans. vol. proﬁt climate situation
Total assets (growth rates) 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.75 0.72
(+1) (+1) (+1) (+1) (0)
i. Maxima of cross-correlation functions and corresponding leads and lags of reported time series.
Read, for example: “quarterly growth rates of total assests have a lag of one quarter behind predicted
conﬁdence; the corresponding correlation coeﬃcient at lag +1 is 0.73” ii. Sample period: 2007.I to
2010.II. iii. Quarterly data of ifo and ZEW are obtained by averaging original monthly data.
14order to learn more about the particularities and special features of the CFS data. The
evidence in this Chapter reveals that CFS conﬁdence indicators do behave in a familiar
fashion known from other well-acknowledged indicators.
3 Measuring uncertainty during the Financial Crisis
3.1 Motivation and Methods
Uncertainty is considered as an important factor of economic recessions3. The recent
paper by Bloom (2009) argues within an RBC model that ﬁrms postpone hiring and
investment decisions when the future is highly uncertain, because adjustment to optimal
capital and labor inputs is costly and would need to be revised (perhaps more than once)
when future demand would not meet future capacities. Thus, to avoid expensive sunk
costs from excess capacity or from hiring and ﬁring labor, it makes sense to wait for more
certain expectations of the future economy before ﬁnal decisions will be made. Bloom
(2009) measured uncertainty by making use of a stock market volatility index. Bachmann
et al. (2010, see their Appendix), replicating Bloom (2009) using U.S. data and employing
Bloom’s measure of uncertainty, ﬁnds that only in the 1975, 1980 and 1991 recessions (out
of 15 NBER recessions) volatility was high at the beginning of a recession, in no case was
volatility high prior to a recession. Also, papers by Chugh (2009) and Popescu and Smets
(2009) cast some doubt on the claim in Bloom (2009) that stock-market uncertainty
shocks are a major cause of recessions.
Analyzing the recent past of the German economy, this paper, too, cannot conﬁrm a clear
negative correlation between stock market volatility (measured by VDAX) and investment
(see Figure A.1) in the medium or long run. However, we do observe a clear decline of
investment after the Lehman crisis in September 2008, whereas volatility sharply rose
during October/November 20084. The drop of investment activities started in October
3To avoid confusion, here ‘uncertainty’ does not necessarily imply uncertainty in the sense of math-
ematical statistics, where dealing with uncertainty means knowledge of statistical regularities such as
distribution parameters or population moments. Thus, contrary to statistical uncertainty, ‘uncertainty’
does not allow calculation of mathematical expectations.
4Note, however, that volatility did not immediately increase after the bankruptcy of the Lehman bank
on September 15th, 2008. As can be seen from daily realizations of the VDAX (cf. Appendix Figure A.1),
the sharp increase did not happen before October 2008.
15Figure 3.1: Stock market volatility and investment in Germany
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2008, i.e. within the same month of the rapid rise of stock market volatility, but the most
dramatic change occurred during December 2008 and January 2009, i.e. three months
later, when the investment index plummeted from 107.1 down to 79.5.
Using a tentative cross-correlation analysis based on the whole period 2006 until 2010 (last
observation: March 2010), it can be conﬁrmed that uncertainty (i.e. market volatility)
has a lead over real activities (Figure 3.2.a). The cross-correlation function of uncertainty
shocks and growth of rates of investment has a signiﬁcant minimum value of -0.45 at lead 3,
suggesting that (unexpected) growth of uncertainty is followed by a decline of investment
three months later. However, checking the robustness of this result (see Figure 3.2.b), it
can be seen that both the estimated negative correlation and the lag of investment do
not show up when we use data of the period before the default of the Lehman bank in
September 2008: All correlation coeﬃcients lie within the 95%-conﬁdence band of ‘white
noise’ time series. In contrast, the picture completely changes for the most recent months
of the sample, i.e. after September 2008: Here (see Figure 3.2.c) the negative correlations
correspond to the observation that the very strong volatility shock has been followed by
a signiﬁcant decline in investment. According to the cross-correlation function, the lag of
16real data to ﬁnancial data amounts to four months. The delay might be due to existing
contracts with suppliers and other reasons of retarding and slowing down production5.
Given the limited reliability of stock market volatility for predicting recessions found in
the recent literature, it seems to be promising to have a fresh look at well-established
indicators of uncertainty and check whether they can be considered as useful alternatives
to stock market volatility. Analyzing the interrelationship between ‘uncertainty’ and eco-
nomic activity is not a new topic. ‘Uncertainty’ in the sense of Bloom (2009) has already
been dealt with in early papers of survey expectations such as Knoebl (1974) and Koenig
et al. (1981). Nerlove (1983) in his paper on ‘expectations, plans and realizations’ empha-
sizes that the expression ‘expectation’ in papers using survey data should not be confused
with ‘mathematical expectation’. Similar to the one in Bloom (2009) also Nerlove’s mo-
tivation stems from making decisions under ‘uncertainty’. For that reason he preferred to
deal not only with ‘expectations’ but he also introduced the notion ‘plans’ which are some-
times hard to distinguish from (non-mathematical) expectations, in particular when ﬁrms
are asked for their future ‘business conditions’ (i.e. what is called ‘Gesch¨ aftserwartungen’
in the ifo questionnaire Marc Nerlove was analyzing in Nerlove, 1983). Moreover, Nerlove,
too, points at the ‘wait and see’ eﬀect of uncertainty:
Planning and decision making are themselves costly activities. Therefore only what
is necessary to plan will be planned, only decisions which cannot be postponed will be
made, and only the information about the future necessary to those plans and decisions
and only to the accuracy warranted by the cost of error will be gathered. Plans will not
always be fulﬁlled, single-valued expectations will often turn out to be wrong, and both will
be continually revised. (Nerlove, 1983, p. 1252)
In our subsequent empirical analysis (Chapter 4), we are using both traditional and in-
novative concepts of measuring ‘uncertainty’ based on CFS data. All indices are based on
individual qualitative responses of survey participants as deﬁned in Section 2.
5Taking levels of investment and volatility instead of their growth rates (which is misleading because of
spurious correlation problems) reveals a positive bivariate correlation for both subperiods, i.e. before and
after September 2008, whereas the cross-correlation function of the whole period under investigation shows
a negative correlation and a lead of four months of the volatility index over investment (see Appendix,
Figure A2).
17Figure 3.2: Cross correlation between stock market volatility and investment
(a) Total period 2006 - 2010
(b) Pre-Lehmann period 2006 until September 2008
(c) Post-Lehmann period (Oktober 2008 and later)
Notes: ‘lead and ‘lag denote lead or lag of quarterly (q.o.q.) growth rates of market volatility, d vdax,
compared to quarterly growth rates of investment, d inv; values represent correlation coeﬃcients at
respective leads and lags. Monthly data range from June 2006 to May 2010.
18We rewrite equation (2.1) for reasons of readability:
Ci =

      
      
1 if respondent is positive (about current/future situation)
0 if respondent is neutral (about current/future situation)
−1 if respondent is negative (about current/future situation)
na if no certain answer (i.e. ‘+’, ‘=’ or ‘-’) given
(3.1)
As described in more detail in Section 2 of this paper, individual responses are aggregate
as balances C, which we interpret as indicator as indicators of conﬁdence (see Section 2).
The ﬁrst measure of uncertainty used in this paper is the standard deviation SC responses
Ci which, after employing S2
C = C2 − C
2
, is calculated as
SC =
 
P + + P − − (P + + P −)2 (3.2)
SC covers ‘uncertainty’ among survey respondents about the prevailing economic situa-
tion (this measure is also used by Bachmann et al., 2010). When applied to the current
situation of respondents, SC measures the degree of heterogeneity of companies during
the current economic situation. This is diﬀerent from the dispersion of ‘uncertain’ future
‘plans and expectations’ (in the sense of Nerlove, 1983) which can be quantiﬁed using
survey questions about forthcoming time periods (the CFS survey asks for investment
and hiring decisions three months ahead).
The second and third measures of uncertainty we are going to implement are based on
what Nerlove (1983) referred to as ‘surprises’. These are forecast errors or non-fulﬁllment
of plans. For each quarter t we have a look at the realization (assessment of the cur-
rent situation) and at the forecast made for t in period t − 1. Following Nerlove (1983),
we quantify the surprise of forecast error (FE) as shown in Table 3.1, again not taking
companies with uncertain answers into account at this stage.
Using FE we compute mean, standard deviation and skewness across all ﬁrms (given we
have valid data in t − 1 and t) for each period6. Standard deviation, SFE, and skew-
6Note that extreme surprises (such as a realization of -1 after an expectation of +1) are not deﬁned
as -2 or +2, but rather as -1 and +1. This has the disadvantage that extreme surprises are not treated
19Table 3.1: Deﬁnition of Forecast Error (FE): potential outcomes
‘Increase’ in t ‘Unchanged’ in t ‘Decrease’ in t
Expected ‘Increase’ for t in t-1 0 -1 -1
Expected ‘Unchanged’ for t in t-1 1 0 -1
Expected ‘Decrease’ for t in t-1 1 1 0
ness, SkFE , represent the second and third measures of uncertainty used in the empirical
study (see below). Taking the skewness in addition to the standard deviation allows us
to draw some additional conclusions about the asymmetry of positive and negative sur-
prises (whereas the standard deviation weighs positive deviations from the mean equal
to negative deviations such that no further information about the reasons of measured
uncertainty can be obtained).
Unlike other survey data on business expectations, the CFS survey does not force respon-
dents to ﬁll in ‘+’, ‘=’ or ‘-’. Participants are oﬀered a ‘no response’ category if they
are uncertain about their assessment or expectation7. Thus, the share of ‘no response’
answers represents a straightforward motivation of the fourth measure of uncertainty. It
is simply deﬁned as follows:
P
U =
1
N∗
N∗  
i=1
nai (3.3)
where nai = 1 if respondent i had ‘no response’ in two subsequent periods t and t − 1
(nai = 0 otherwise), and N∗ being the number of valid responses in two subsequent
waves of the CFS survey. Here, two subsequent periods are employed in order to capture
systematic response behavior and to exclude casual participations.
diﬀerently from simple surprises, but it has the advantage that FE has just three potential outcomes and
that summing up squared and cubic terms for obtaining second and third moments is not highly sensitive
to few outliers.
7Of course, likewise participants might be unwilling to respond because they do not want to share
any private information with others. This interpretation does not exclude that changing shares of such
prudential considerations indicate changes in uncertainty.
203.2 Results
In this sub-chapter we compare four indicators of uncertainty which have been introduced
above. These indicators are as follows:
a) Standard deviation SC of individual survey responses regarding current and future
conﬁdence in terms of transaction volume and proﬁts
b) Standard deviation of errors (‘surprises’) of forecasting/planning investment of the
current period, when the prediction was made three months ago, SFE
c) Skewness of errors (‘surprises’) of forecasting/planning investment of the current
period, when the prediction was made three months ago, SkFE
d) Share of ‘no response’ replies, P U
We compare CFS survey data to GDP, investment and total assets which we use as
reference time series of real economic performance. Moreover, in order to learn how CFS
survey-based measures of uncertainty relate to the standard stock market measure of
uncertainty, we add the German market volatility index, VDAX, to the list of variables
under comparison.
Table 3.2 shows results of a cross-correlation analysis. To avoid spurious results arising
from trending data, time series of investment, GDP and total assets are used as quarterly
(quarter-on-quarter) growth rates. VDAX has no evident long-run trend such that we em-
ploy the original time series. The same holds for the CFS uncertainty measures introduced
above. All but two8 extreme values of estimated cross-correlation functions have the ex-
pected sign: a) High heterogeneity/uncertainty about current/future economic situations
at the micro level is associated with low rates of aggregate economic performance, b)
survey-based indicators of uncertainty are positively correlated with stock market volatil-
ity, VDAX, i.e. the standard measure of uncertainty used in the literature (see, e.g., Bloom
2009).
As regards investment, Table 3.2 reveals that uncertainty measures based on the standard
deviation of individual conﬁdence responses, SC, of predicted proﬁts as well as of predicted
8The only exceptions are the positive correlation between ‘SFE - proﬁts’ and investment and the
negative correlation between ‘SFE - proﬁts’ and VDAX.
21transaction volumes have a lead of one quarter over investment growth, whereas SC related
to the current situation does not show any clear lead or lag. Results on GDP, total assets
and VDAX, too, conﬁrm that SC of predicted transaction volume and predicted proﬁts
deliver the highest correlation with actual economic data (see rows 3 and 4 of Table 3.2).
The overall lead of both indicators is one quarter on GDP, even two quarters ahead of
total assets. Figure 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate the negative association with investment and
GDP, respectively. VDAX and ‘SC of predicted transaction volume’ as well as VDAX and
‘SC of predicted proﬁts’ show closely related and coinciding patterns, as can be seen from
the highly signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcients with zero lead or lag (Table 3.2). Figure 3.5
provides some additional graphical impression.
Table 3.2: Cross-correlation functions r(Xt,Yt−τ): performance of survey-based indicators
Xt\Yt−τ Investment GDP Total assets VDAX
(growth rate) (growth rates) (growth rates)
SC - transaction volume -0.52 -0.50 -0.63** 0.64**
(0) (0) (0) (+1)
SC - proﬁts -0.42 -0.38 -0.59* 0.49
(0) (0) (0) (0)
SC - predicted transaction volume -0.52 -0.59* -0.49 0.63**
(-1) (-1) (-2) (0)
SC - predicted proﬁts -0.50 -0.62* -0.55* 0.69**
(-1) (-1) (-2) (0)
SFE - transaction volume -0.23 -0.25 -0.41 0.41
(-1) (-1) (-4) (-3)
SFE - proﬁts 0.33 -0.41 -0.16 -0.29
(-3) (-3) (+2) (-1)
SkFE - transaction volume -0.31 -0.34 -0.50 0.37
(0) (0) (-1) (+1)
SkFE - proﬁts -0.43 -0.52 -0.56* 0.56*
(0) (0) (-1) (+1)
i. Maxima of cross-correlation functions r(Xt,Yt−τ) and corresponding lags τ(of X behind Y ) of
reported time series. Read, for example: “SC -predicted proﬁts has a lag of -1 (i.e. a lead of +1)
with respect to quarterly (q.o.q.) GDP growth rates; the corresponding correlation coeﬃcient at lag
-1 (lead +1) is -0.62”. ii. Sample period: 2007.I to 2010.II. iii. Quarterly data on investment and
VDAX are obtained by averaging original monthly data. iv) **), *) denote signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5% - level.
Compared to SC, standard deviation and skewness of forecast errors both seem to have
rather weak connections to investment. The same holds true for most estimated correlation
coeﬃcients measuring the interrelationship of SFE and SkFE with GDP, total assets and
22Figure 3.3: Uncertainty and investment growth
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Figure 3.4: Uncertainty and GDP Growth
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23Figure 3.5: Uncertainty and VDAX
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VDAX. The only exception is SkFE - proﬁts which is signiﬁcantly correlated with total
assets (-0.56, lead = one quarter) and VDAX (+0.56, lag = one quarter). Figure 3.6 reveals
that skewness, i.e SkFE, might indeed entail some additional information on standard
deviation, i.e SFE . The skewness indicator (displayed in period t + 1) is clearly negative
until the second quarter of 2008, indicating that there have been more negative than
positive surprises throughout the pre-Lehman time period. In 2009, after having realized
the surprisingly well performing economy, the picture changed as the sign of the skewness
indicator turned positive. Some ﬁnal reversal can be observed for the 2nd quarter 2010,
when the Greece crisis has led to some negative shocks.
In contrast to other business surveys, CFS questionnaires oﬀer ‘no response’ categories for
those participants who deliberately decide not to respond to given survey categories. Given
that such behavior represents ‘uncertainty’ about the exact current or future situation,
it seems quite natural to interpret the share of ‘no response’ respondents as independent
indicators of uncertainty. Figure 3.7 reveals that the share was about 10% to 14% in 2007.I,
shrinking down to 4% to 5% in 2008.II to and ﬂuctuating around about 5% thereafter.
As expected for uncertainty measures, the strongest ﬂuctuations can be observed for
24Figure 3.6: Growth of total assets in Standard deviation and skewness of forecast errors in
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predictions (of both transaction volume and proﬁts). Table 3.3 presents the results of
some cross-correlation analysis based on ‘no response’ shares. As the variance from the
strong downward trends of the ﬁrst six quarters would dominate the correlation analysis
and cause misleading lead-lag patterns, all times series but VDAX enter the analysis as
quarter-on-quarter growth rates. All signs are as expected. The highest correlation with all
included ‘real world’ time series has the ‘no response’ share of predicted proﬁts. Moreover,
it has a lead of one quarter over investment and GDP, it is two quarters ahead of total
assets, and even one quarter ahead of VDAX.
The two-quarter lead over total assets is illustrated in Figure 3.8. For expository reasons,
the sign of the no-response growth rate is turned negative and the lead is exposed by
displaying no-response realizations of period t in period (t+2). After doing so, we observe
a highly coinciding time series behavior during the period 2008.III until 2009.II. Disre-
garding the outlier of GDP growth in 2009.III, both time series share the same upward
trend until 2010.II.
25Figure 3.7: Shares of ‘no response’ replies
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Table 3.3: Cross-correlation functions r(Xt,Yt−τ): performance of ‘no response’ shares
Xt\Yt−τ Investment GDP Total assets VDAX
(growth rates) (growth rates) (growth rates)
PU - transaction volume -0.61* -0.60* -0.47 0.42
(growth rates) (+1) (+1) (-2) (+1)
PU - proﬁts -0.39 -0.35 -0.34 0.39
(growth rates) (-1) (-1) (+1) (0)
PU - predicted transaction volume -0.38 -0.37 -0.56 0.52
(growth rates) (-1) (-2) (-2) (-1)
PU - predicted proﬁts -0.60* -0.61* -0.59* 0.67**
(growth rates) (-1) (-1) (-2) (-1)
i. Maxima of cross-correlation functions r(Xt,Yt−τ) and corresponding lags τ(of X behind Y ) of
reported time series. Read, for example: “the quarterly growth rate of the share of ‘no response’
replies regarding the prediction of proﬁts, PU , has a lag of -1 (i.e. a lead of +1) with respect to
quarterly GDP growth rates; the corresponding correlation coeﬃcient at lag -1 is -0.61”. ii. Sample
period: 2007.I to 2010.II. iii. Quarterly data on investment and VDAX are obtained by averaging
original monthly data. iv. **), *) denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% - level.
26Figure 3.8: Share of ‘no response’-replies of proﬁt prediction as leading indicator of total assets
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Of course, given the short time series we have, it is much too early to consider reported
coinciding patterns as evidence of highly reliable (leading) indicators of the ﬁnancial sector
or even the economy as a whole. However, the reported results represent some interesting
and promising observations that should be focused on in future research and practiced
after forthcoming waves of the CFS survey have materialized.
4 Conclusion
A high degree of uncertainty about the current and future situation of the banking sys-
tem and its inherent systemic risk is considered as one of the main reasons of the recent
ﬁnancial crisis. Many authors, see in particular Bloom (2009), argue that uncertainty and
wait-and-see behavior cause recessions because ﬁrms refrain from committing themselves
to costly investment and hiring decisions. Thus, measuring uncertainty might help to bet-
ter understand the reasons driving the recent turmoil and should improve the forecasting
of future recessions. In this paper, we use German survey data from the Center for Fi-
nancial Studies (CFS, Frankfurt) to construct indicators of conﬁdence and uncertainty.
27Germany is of particular interest as it is the strongest European economy and it has been
severely aﬀected by the ﬁnancial turmoil. The most important innovative feature of the
CFS survey compared to well-established ifo (Munich) and ZEW (Mannheim) surveys of
Germany’s economic prospects is the focus on the ﬁnancial sector, i.e. respondents of the
ﬁnancial sector report on their individual situation within the ﬁnancial sector. This gives
a unique opportunity to analyze the core sector of the recent turmoil during the time
period of the ﬁnancial instability. Following standard methods of aggregating individual
survey data, we ﬁrst present and introduce the CFS survey and compare CFS indicators
of conﬁdence and predicted conﬁdence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major method-
ological contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well
established concepts, we introduce new measures of uncertainty based on the skewness of
forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty
indicators ﬁt quite well with patterns of real and ﬁnancial time series of the time period
2007 to 2010. So far, CFS survey data are only available for a relatively short time period.
However, results presented in this paper show a promising performance for measures
of conﬁdence and uncertainty such that future waves of the CFS survey will provide
researchers, professional ﬁnancial analysts and economic forecasters with some excellent
information about transaction volume, proﬁts and other indicators of the current and
future situation of the ﬁnancial sector.
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29A Appendix
Figure A.1: VDAX
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30Table A.1: List of CFS survey participants by users
Group Branch / Wave 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 Total Ave
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
1 Asset Management 7 21 24 30 29 29 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 28 367 26
1 Bank 60 84 90 107 109 108 108 108 127 128 128 119 119 120 1515 108
1 Brokerage 0 11 12 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 188 13
1 Exchange 3 5 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 113 8
1 Insurance 12 14 14 21 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 311 22
1 Investment Bank 0 16 22 23 23 22 22 22 21 22 22 20 20 20 275 20
1 VC & PE 0 9 10 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 290 21
2 Accounting & Tax 11 15 15 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 337 24
2 Advisory 15 44 52 62 61 61 61 61 62 61 61 60 60 60 781 56
2 Financial Service 3 16 23 27 27 27 27 27 29 29 29 30 29 30 353 25
2 Lawyer 17 26 29 41 39 39 39 39 39 40 40 39 39 39 505 36
2 Media 0 18 17 21 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 17 18 18 247 18
2 Rating Agency 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 82 6
2 Wealth Management 4 12 13 22 22 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 248 18
3 Academic Institution 0 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 7 7 7 7 7 77 6
3 Interest Group 3 12 16 17 17 16 16 16 16 13 13 14 14 14 197 14
3 Supervisory 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 73 5
4 Nonﬁnancial Service 3 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 184 13
4 Real Estate 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 47 3
Total 149 338 376 478 481 476 476 476 497 496 496 483 483 485 6190 442
3
1Table A.2: List of CFS survey participants by entity
Group Branch / Wave 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 Total Ave
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
1 Asset Management 6 18 21 25 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 23 305 22
1 Bank 37 66 74 86 88 88 88 88 100 100 100 95 95 95 1200 86
1 Brokerage 0 10 11 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 164 12
1 Exchange 1 3 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 74 5
1 Insurance 10 12 12 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 17 227 16
1 Investment Bank 0 12 18 19 19 18 18 18 17 17 17 16 16 16 221 16
1 VC & PE 0 9 10 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 279 20
2 Accounting & Tax 6 10 10 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 201 14
2 Advisory 11 41 49 58 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 56 56 56 726 52
2 Financial Service 3 16 23 27 27 27 27 27 29 29 29 29 29 30 352 25
2 Lawyer 15 23 26 38 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 36 469 34
2 Media 0 16 16 19 18 18 18 18 18 17 17 16 17 17 225 16
2 Rating Agency 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 68 5
2 Wealth Management 4 12 13 22 22 20 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 248 18
3 Academic Institution 0 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 52 4
3 Interest Group 2 11 13 14 14 13 13 13 13 12 12 13 13 13 169 12
3 Supervisory 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 28 2
4 Nonﬁnancial Service 3 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 184 13
4 Real Estate 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 27 2
Total 104 286 327 408 410 406 406 406 418 415 415 405 406 407 5219 373
3
2Figure A.2: Cross correlation between stock market volatility and investment
(a) Total period 2006 - 2010
(b) Pre-Lehmann period 2006 until September 2008
(c) Post-Lehmann period (Oktober 2008 and later)
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